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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SURVEY: SEARCH AND SEIZURE
INTRODUCTION
In criminal procedure jurisprudence during the 1993 term, the Tenth
Circuit brought its search and seizure law in line with precedent from
other circuits and went beyond its own precedent. In United States v.
Brown1 the court formally adopted the warrant severability doctrine.
Under this doctrine, already the law in eight other circuits, reviewing
courts can sever search warrants which have both constitutional and un-
constitutional provisions. The Tenth Circuit, however, provided no appar-
ent standards to govern lower courts' application of the doctrine. In
United States v. Butler2 the Tenth Circuit court substantially confused set-
tled precedent and trivialized the exigent circumstances exception to the
warrant requirement. In Butler, the court upheld a plain view seizure
where the officer was not legally present under any prior theory. This
broadening of arresting officers' ability to immediately enter the home,
and presumably other areas, owned by an arrested individual cannot be
squared with any existing law under the Fourth Amendment.
This Survey discusses the warrant severability doctrine and the Tenth
Circuit's adoption of the doctrine in United States v. Brown, concluding that
this case provides no meaningful direction to the trial courts in applying
the doctrine. Part II analyzes United States v. Butler in the context of the
exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, finding that
the case substantially broadens and trivializes the exception.
I. ADOPTION OF THE WARRANT SEVERABILITy DOCTRINE
A. Background
The Fourth Amendment requires that search warrants describe with
particularity both the place to be searched and the items to be seized.
3
This requirement leaves little discretion in the hands of the officer execut-
ing the warrant.4 The Tenth Circuit elaborated on this specificity require-
ment by stating that the search must be "confined in scope to particularly
described evidence relating to a specific crime for which there is demon-
strated probable cause." 5 Prior to the adoption of the warrant severability
doctrine, if any part of a warrant did not conform to the Fourth Amend-
1. 984 F.2d 1074 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 204 (1993).
2. 980 F.2d 619 (10th Cir. 1992).
3. The Fourth Amendment provides "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause
... and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized." U.S. CONsT. amend. IV. See also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467
(1971) (particularity requirement prevents a "general, exploratory rummaging in a person's
belongings").
4. See Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927).
5. Voss v. Bergsgaard, 774 F.2d 402, 404 (10th Cir. 1985).
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ment mandate, the entire warrant was invalid. Any evidence seized under
the warrant's authority was inadmissible at trial. 6
The warrant severability doctrine avoids the exclusion of evidence ob-
tained under a valid warrant provision. The doctrine allows the court to
sever the unconstitutional portion of the warrant from the constitutional
portion and suppress only that evidence which officers seize under the
unconstitutional provisions. 7 The doctrine is consistent with the purpose
of the exclusionary rule.8 The rule deters officers from illegally obtaining
evidence by excluding that evidence from trial, thereby ensuring that of-
ficers do not profit from constitutional violations.9 The doctrine, however,
still allows consideration of evidence which officers constitutionally
obtain.
1 0
When a court is considering severing a warrant, the foremost question
is whether the court may sever the warrant at all. Because the Fourth
Amendment prohibits general warrants, a court must decide either that it
can sever the constitutional portions of the warrant or that the unconstitu-
tional portions so dominate the warrant that the court must consider the
warrant as general and therefore unseverable. 1 The Supreme Court ad-
dressed such a situation in Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York 12 In Lo-Ji Sales, a
warrant authorized the police to search an adult bookstore and to seize
two adult films and "'[t]he following items that the Court independently
[on examination] has determined to be possessed in violation of Article
235 of the Penal Law . . . . ' " There were no items listed. The Town
Justice accompanied the police to the bookstore in order to determine
which items violated the code. At the bookstore, an investigator wrote into
6. Rosemarie A. Lynskey, Note, A Middle Ground Approach to the Exclusionary Remedy:
Reconciling the Redaction Doctrine with United States v. Leon, 41 VAND. L. Rav. 811, 813 (1988).
Some commentators criticized the severity of invalidating the entire warrant for minor er-
rors. See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TRATssE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§ 4.6(f), at 258 (2d ed. 1987).
7. Prior to the 1993 Tenth Circuit term, eight circuits had adopted some version of the
severability doctrine. See United States v. George, 975 F.2d 72, 79 (2d Cir. 1992); United
States v. Blakeney, 942 F.2d 1001, 1027 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 646 (1991), and cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 881 (1992); United States v. Gomez-Soto, 723 F.2d 649, 654 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 466 U.S. 977 (1984); United States v. Fitzgerald, 724 F.2d 633, 636-37 (8th Cir. 1983)
(en banc), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 950 (1984); United States v. Riggs, 690 F.2d 298, 300 (1st Cir.
1982); United States v. Christine, 687 F.2d 749, 754 (3d Cir. 1982); In re Search Warrant
Dated July 4, 1977, 667 F.2d 117, 130 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 926 (1982);
United States v. Cook, 657 F.2d 730, 735 (5th Cir. 1981). The Seventh Circuit, while not
specifically addressing the warrant severability issue, construes warrants more narrowly than
the warrants' language requires in order to avoid finding the warrants overbroad. Donovan
v. Fall River Foundry Co., 712 F.2d 1103, 1111 (7th Cir. 1983). The Fourth Circuit has not
addressed the issue of warrant severability. For an example of the Tenth Circuit's approach
to this problem prior to Brown, see infra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
8. John W. Kastelic, Project, The Exclusionary Rule, Fourteenth Annual Review of Criminal




11. Charles L. Cantrell, Search Warrants: A View of the Process, 14 OKLA. CITY. U. L. Rav. 1,
67-68 (1989). See also Kastelic, supra note 8, at 397 n.832.
12. 442 U.S. 319 (1979).
13. Id. at 321-23.
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the warrant the titles of the films, magazines and coin-operated film pro-
jectors which the Town Justice found obscene after viewing.
14
The Court held that the warrant was similar to the general warrants
the Fourth Amendment sought to prohibit.1 5 Beyond the two films listed,
the warrant allowed the officials conducting the search total discretionary
power in determining what they should seize. Of key importance to the
Court's invalidation of the entire warrant was the fact that "the search be-
gan and progressed pursuant to the sweeping open-ended authorization
in the warrant."1 6 The search was not initially limited to a search for the
specific items listed; rather, the discovery of additional "illegal" items in-
creased the scope of the search.
17
In reaching its decision in Brown, the Tenth Circuit majority relied
heavily on United States v. George 8 and United States v. LeBron.' 9 In George,
the Second Circuit held severance possible for a warrant which provided
for the search and seizure of a number of specific items 20 and "any other
evidence relating to the commission of a crime." 21 The officers seized,
under the plain view doctrine, 22 a loaded firearm which the defendant, a
convicted felon, could not legally possess.
2 3
The court held that the warrant's "any other evidence" provision was
overbroad. 24 On remand, the court directed the trial court to consider
whether severance of the warrant was appropriate.2 5 If severance was
available, the evidence seized under the plain view doctrine was admissi-
ble.2 6 The court cautioned, however, that the doctrine was inapplicable if
(1) the warrant was devoid of sufficiently particular language; (2) the war-
rant was not meaningfully severable; or (3) the constitutional portions
made up an "insignificant or tangential" portion of the warrant.
27
In United States v. LeBron, the Eighth Circuit majority held severable a
warrant which described three stolen items with particularity but in addi-
tion authorized the search and seizure of "any other property, description
14. Id. at 323.
15. Id. at 325.
16. Id. at 326.
17. Id.
18. 975 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1992).
19. 729 F.2d 533 (8th Cir. 1984).
20. The list included "1 [blurgundy purse, I burgundy shoulder bag, credit cards, per-
sonal papers, and ID of Dawn Wood. Misc. photos, keys to Honda motorcycle, dark attache
case containing McDonalds management material, McDonalds uniform Handgun, workboot
of similar design to plaster cast . " George, 975 F.2d at 74.
21. Id.
22. In order for evidence to be admissible under the plain view doctrine, there are two
requirements: first, that the officer was lawfully present when he observed the evidence; and
second, that the officer immediately upon viewing the evidence had probable cause to be-
lieve that it was incriminating. For a more complete description of the plain view doctrine,
see infta notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
23. Geoge, 975 F.2d at 75.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 80.
26. Id. at 79.
27. Id. at 79-80.
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unknown, for which there exists probable cause to believe it stolen."2 8
The court found this clause unconstitutional.2 9 The police seized all three
items described in the valid portion of the warrant. Weapons the officials
later seized were not admissible under the plain view doctrine because the
officers were no longer legally present under the warrant.
3 0
Prior to Brown, the Tenth Circuit indicated a general approval of the
warrant severability doctrine, even though the court never explicitly
adopted it. In United States v. Leafy,31 for example, the Tenth Circuit
noted in dictum that the severability doctrine was a possible remedy to
retain valid portions of a warrant.
32
B. Tenth Circuit Opinion: United States v. Brown
33
On January 29, 1991, a detective obtained a search warrant (Warrant
I) based on his affidavit which stated two primary grounds for probable
cause.3 4 First, two people at the defendant's house had told an informant
they stole and sold vehicles and they had offered to sell the informant
other goods well below their fair value.3 5 Second, the detective himself
observed an individual at the defendant's house working on a dismantled
truck with a cutting torch.3 6 The detective also observed a second truck
which the informant had stated was stolen.
3 7
Warrant I, a state warrant, authorized a search for a large number of
specific vehicle parts and other items,3 8 but included a final sentence au-
thorizing the seizure of "[a] ny other item which the Officers determine or
have reasonable belief is stolen while executing this search warrant."
3 9
The warrant authorized a maximum time of sixteen hours but the search
actually lasted fifty-one hours. On February 7, 1991, after the detective
and other officers had executed Warrant I, the detective applied for a sec-
28. 729 F.2d at 535-36.
29. Id. at 537.
30. Id. at 538-39.
31. 846 F.2d 592 (10th Cir. 1988).
32. Id. at 606, n.25.
33. 984 F.2d 1074 (10th Cir. 1993).
34. Id. at 1075.
35. Id. at 1075-76.
36. Id. at 1076.
37. Id.
38. The enumerated items included:
Vehicle parts to include the following, but not limited to: Bumpers, grills, fenders,
hoods, cabs, dashes, truck beds, engines, transmissions, drive shafts, frames, rear
ends, springs, steering parts, seats and other interior parts, VIN plates, titles, vehicle
registrations, blank registration forms, bills of sale, blank titles, drive-out stickers,
broadcast sheets, EPA stickers, windows, doors, tires, rims and truck bed toolboxes.
Tools or toolboxes which are stolen or contain tools that can be used to disassemble
or reassemble any vehicle, welders and cutting torches, air compressors, computers,
computer components, photocopy machines, firearms, protective devices, carpeting
which also may be stolen.
Id.
39. Id. For an explanation of why this language is not merely an authorization of plain




ond state search warrant (Warrant II).40 The detective listed items officers
observed while executing Warrant I which were not specifically described
in the warrant.4 1 Warrant II authorized the seizure of specific property,
4 2
but also included a catch-all authorization to seize "any other item which
the Officers have determined or have reason to believe is stolen, while
executing this warrant."
43
While executing Warrant II, the officers smelled methamphetamine
in the house and, in fact, found a laboratory in the garage. 44 Based on
that information, the officers obtained a federal search warrant (Warrant
III) and executed it on the same day.45 The evidence secured under War-
rant III led to the defendant's conviction for conspiracy to manufacture
methamphetamine.
4 6
The defendant appealed, challenging the district court's denial of his
motion to suppress all evidence the officers seized under the warrants.
4 7
The defendant claimed that Warrants I and II were overbroad. Since the
officers' observations while executing Warrants I and II formed the sole
probable cause basis for Warrant III, the evidence seized under Warrant
III was also inadmissible as the "fruit" of the unconstitutionally broad first
two warrants. 48 The Tenth Circuit affirmed the conviction, holding that
the unconstitutionally broad final sentences of Warrants I and II were sev-
erable from the sufficiently particular list of items. Therefore, the evi-
dence seized under Warrant III was not the fruit of illegal warrants.
49
1. Majority Opinion
Judge Paul J. Kelly, writing for the majority, began by addressing
whether the warrants in question were sufficiently particular to satisfy the
Fourth Amendment. The majority noted that both Warrants I and II spe-
cifically described a number of objects to be seized, 50 but assumed argu-
endo that the final sentences under those warrants were not descriptive,
did not adequately limit the officers' discretion, and were therefore
unconstitutional.
5 1
The majority held that the final sentences of Warrants I and II were
severable from the constitutionally adequate portions of those warrants.
52
40. Id. at 1076.
41. Id.
42. Warrant II provided for the seizure of, "a Quasar Microwave . . . A brown Cedar
chest that is faded on the top lid and has a tray on the inside, approximately 3' wide and 4' in






48. Id. In Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), the Supreme Court held that
evidence obtained by exploitation of a constitutional violation was tainted "fruit of the poi-
sonous tree" and was inadmissible. Id. at 488.
49. Brown, 984 F.2d at 1078.
50. See supra notes 38 and 42.
51. Brown, 984 F.2d at 1077 n.1.
52. Id. at 1078.
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The majority further held that the severed warrants provided a lawful basis
for the officers' presence in the defendant's home; therefore, the officers'
observations while on the premises provided the probable cause for the
additional warrants. 53 Under the severed Warrant I, the state officers were
legally present in the defendant's home when they observed the stolen
items described in Warrant II. Similarly, they were legally in the defend-
ant's home under the severed Warrant II when they smelled the
methamphetamine. Warrant III, which was based on the smell of
methamphetamine, was therefore valid.
5 4
2. Dissenting Opinion
Judge Seth's dissent acknowledged that warrant severance is a proper
remedy, but argued that in this case the overbroad language "so tainted
the entire warrant that severance is notjustified."55 Because Warrant I was
"so tainted," the officers were not lawfully on the defendant's property
while executing that warrant. Warrants II and III were therefore illegal as
the fruit of the invalid Warrant 1.56
Much of the dissent focused on the overbroad language of Warrant I.
The dissent asserted that the court could not construe the overbroad lan-
guage as authorizing plain view seizures, 57 nor could the court argue that
the officers were lawfully on the premises under the "good faith" excep-
tion 58 in order to validate any of the warrants. 59 The dissent pointed out
that while Warrant I authorized a search on January 29, 1991, between
6:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m., the actual search lasted at least fifty-one hours
and did not end until January 31, 1991.60 In addition, officers invited
many townspeople, whose property had been stolen, onto the defendant's
property in order to identify and claim their property.
6 1
As a result of the overbroad scope and extraordinary duration of the
search, the dissent argued that Warrant I more closely resembled a gen-
eral warrant than a warrant with both constitutional and overbroad por-
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Broum, 984 F.2d at 1078 (Seth, J., dissenting).
56. See id.
57. Id. at 1079. The plain view doctrine requires that the officer have probable cause to
believe the item is stolen in order to seize it, whereas the warrant authorized seizure where
the officer had only a "reason to believe" the item was stolen. Id. See also Horton v. Califor-
nia, 496 U.S. 128 (1990) (discussing the requirements necessary to apply the plain view
doctrine).
58. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (holding that, under the "good faith excep-
tion," evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant ulti-
mately found invalid is admissible).
59. Broun, 984 F.2d at 1080-81. The dissent noted that Warrant I was so "facially and
grossly overbroad" that no officer could have understood it to give guidelines as to what that
officer could seize. Since there could be no reasonable reliance on such a facially defective
warrant, the good faith exception from United States v. Leon could not apply in this case. Id. at
1080.
60. Id. In addition to the large number of tools and auto parts seized, the officers also
took a fishing reel, turquoise stones, Christmas wreaths, Christmas lights and a bug sprayer.
Id.
61. Id. at 1079.
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tions.62 The dissent stated that Warrant I was indistinguishable from the
general warrant in Lo-Ji Sales63 which the Supreme Court held unconstitu-
tional. Warrants II and III were therefore tainted6 by the unconstitution-
ality of Warrant I, and were not valid under any other grounds.6 5
C. Analysis
The court's adoption of the warrant severability doctrine was a pru-
dent decision which brought Tenth Circuit jurisprudence in line with all
circuits that have specifically considered this point of law. 66 The doctrine
is a useful tool which, when correctly applied, avoids suppression of le-
gally-obtained evidence when the warrant is defective due to technical
oversight or overbroad, unjustified authorizations to search. When con-
sidering whether a warrant should be severed, however, it is important to
remember the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against general warrants.
While the language of Warrant I in Brown resembled t he language of war-
rants which other courts of appeals have severed and held valid,6 7 the re-
markable duration of the search in Brown makes it a troublesome case for
the adoption of the severability doctrine. Trial courts will have little gui-
dance in determining how excessive a search's duration must be before
that execution renders a warrant unseverable.
As the majority correctly noted, the language of Warrant I was similar
to many other warrants which courts have severed. In fact, the list of spe-
cific items in Warrant I was more extensive than the lists in many of the
warrants which led to the adoption of the severability doctrine in other
circuits. 6 8 While Warrant I certainly contained overbroad language, it was
not so facially deficient as to appear general in nature when compared
with other warrants which courts have held severable.
The execution of the warrant, however, makes its severance more
problematic. As the dissent noted, the search under Warrant I was to last
for no more than sixteen hours.69 That figure represented the magis-
trate's determination of a reasonable time allotment to search not only for
the enumerated items, but also for the additional "stolen" items the major-
ity in Brown found the officers could not constitutionally seize. 70 Because
the actual search lasted more than three times the stated time limit, the
officers involved were operating largely under the authority of the over-
broad portion of the warrant.
62. Id. at 1082.
63. Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319 (1979).
64. Brown, 984 F.2d at 1082. See supra note 48 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the exclusion of tainted evidence.
65. See id. at 1081.
66. See cases cited supra note 7.
67. See supra text accompanying notes 18-27.
68. See supra notes 20 and 28 and accompanying text.
69. Brown, 984 F.2d at 1080.
70. Id.
1994]
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The search in Brown somewhat parallels the search in Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v.
New York, 71 where' the sufficiently particular portion of the warrant com-
prised a negligible portion of the scope of the total warrant.72 That is, the
sufficiently particular portion of Warrant I in Brown authorized a relatively
small portion of the duration of the search. 73 The search in Brown dif-
fered from that of Lo-Ji Sales which was merely an effort directed at seizing
whatever material the Town Justice deemed as violative of the penal
code. 74 The Lo-Ji warrant, as the search demonstrated, never had any le-
gitimate, particularized aspect.75 Under Warrant I in Brown, however, the
officers devoted substantial time to the discovery of the particular enumer-
ated items. They did not search exclusively under the overbroad lan-
guage. 76 Thus, at least a portion of Warrant I, both on its face and in its
execution, fell within constitutional requirements, and Lo-Ji Sales is
inapposite.
United States v. George7 7 is more useful in this context. The warrant in
George was more facially vague than the Warrant I in Brown. While the
court in George did not decide whether to sever the warrant at issue, it
noted that severance might not be appropriate in a case where the suffi-
ciently particular portions of a warrant composed only an "insignificant or
tangential" portion of the warrant.78 Warrant I in Brown appears to be a
warrant where, in light of the search's duration, the enumerated items
bordered on being insignificant.
In addition, United States v. LeBron79 specifically held that while
searching under an overbroad portion of a severable warrant, the police
are not legally present for the purpose of the plain view or other doc-
trines. 80 The correct question in evaluating Brown is, at what point did the
officers complete the search for sufficiently particularized items under
Warrant I? The majority did not ask that question, nor did it explain why
the excessive duration of the search did not render the warrant
unseverable.
The problem with the result in Brown is not that it adopted the war-
rant severability doctrine; the doctrine itself is useful when correctly ap-
plied. The main problem is that the Brown majority did not examine the
execution of Warrant I. Rather, the majority based its holding purely on
the language of the warrant.8 1 The majority therefore did not address the
proper limits of the warrant severability doctrine. As a result, trial courts
will lack sufficient guidance in determining whether they may properly
71. 442 U.S. at 325.
72. Id.
73. Brown, 984 F.2d at 1082 (Seth, J., dissenting).
74. See supra text accompanying notes 12-17.
75. Lo-Ji Sales, 442 U.S. at 326 (the search began and progressed pursuant to the sweep-
ing, open-ended authorization in the warrant).
76. See Brown, 984 F.2d at 1076.
77. 975 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1992).
78. Id. at 79-80.
79. 729 F.2d 533 (8th Cir. 1984).
80. Id. at 537-38. See also infra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
81. Brown, 984 F.2d at 1077-78.
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sever a warrant.82 With Brown as a guide, trial courts will rarely look be-
yond the language of a warrant to determine whether the warrant was
properly executed.
II. THE TRIVIALIZATION OF THE EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES EXCEPTION TO
THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT
A. Background
Under the Fourth Amendment, warrantless searches and seizures in-
side a home are presumptively unreasonable. 83 Absent consent8 4 or exi-
gent circumstances, a state officer may not enter a person's house unless
the officer possesses a warrant.85 In the absence of a warrant or exigent
circumstances, any evidence seized as a result of the illegal entry is inad-
missible at trial.
86
The Supreme Court has grouped exigent circumstances into several
categories: officers responding to in emergency,8 7 officers in hot pursuit
of a fleeing felon, 88 or officers acting to prevent destruction or removal of
evidence.8 9 These exigent circumstances represent exceptions to the war-
rant requirement and should be as narrowly construed as possible.90
An officer who is in a person's home without a warrant, but whose
presence is supported by an exception to the warrant requirement, for
example, an exigent circumstance, may seize some evidence. Such evi-
dence must be in plain view from the officer's lawful position and the
officer must immediately have probable cause to believe the evidence is
incriminating.9 1 Thus, the officer must be lawfully present, by warrant or
82. This lack of guidance for lower courts concerning which warrants are severable is a
prevalent problem among jurisdictions which have adopted the severability doctrine. See
Mark S. Halpern, Comment, Redaction-the Alternative to the Total Suppression of Evidence Seized
Pursuant to a Partially Invalid Search Warrant, 57 TEMP. L.Q. 77, 79, 91-92 (1984).
83. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980). The Court further stated "[t]he
Fourth Amendment protects the individual's privacy in a variety of settings. In none is the
zone of privacy more clearly defined than when bounded by the unambiguous physical
dimensions of an individual's home-a zone that finds its roots in clear and specific constitu-
tional terms . . . ." Id. at 589.
84. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). Consent must be volun-
tary, but the consenting party does not have to know that he can refuse to consent. Id. at
248-49.
85. Payton, 445 U.S. at 590.
86. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393, 398 (1914). The Supreme Court held that
the exclusionary rule applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961).
87. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326 (1987).
88. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-299 (1967).
89. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966).
90. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). The burden of demonstrating
that exigent circumstances exist is on the prosecution. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752,
762 (1969); see generally Steven D. Allison, Project, Exigent Circumstances, Twenty-Sond Annual
Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1991-199Z 81
GEo. L.J. 853, 902-10 (1993) (discussing the limits of exigent circumstances).
91. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-37 (1990).
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otherwise, 92 in order to invoke the plain view doctrine to legitimize a
seizure.
93
The Supreme Court ostensibly created a new exception to the warrant
requirement in Washington v. Chrisman.94 In Chrisman a campus police of-
ficer stopped the defendant's roommate and asked to see the roommate's
identification. 95 The roommate was drinking and the officer suspected
that he was underage. The roommate had no identification and asked
that the officer allow him to return to his room to obtain it.96 The officer
accompanied the roommate to the room and, while waiting in the thresh-
old of the room, observed marijuana seeds in the room.97 He entered the
room and seized the marijuana.
98
The Court held that an officer has the right to monitor the move-
ments of an arrested person in order "to ensure his own [the officer's]
safety."99 Under those circumstances, there was no requirement of exi-
gent circumstances for the officer to enter the room without a warrant.
Thus, the officer's presence in the room, and therefore the plain view
seizure of the marijuana, were legal.' 0 0
Courts generally have interpreted Chrisman to stand for the proposi-
tion that after a lawful arrest, an arrestee who invites the arresting officer
to accompany him to his home or requests to enter his home grants the
officer a lawful presence in the home.' 0 ' Without the arrestee's invitation
or request that he be allowed to enter his home, the officer must demon-
strate either exigent circumstances or a valid warrant in order to be law-
fully in the home.
10 2
Prior to Chrisman, the Tenth Circuit had addressed the limits of exi-
gent circumstances in United States v. Anthon.10 3 In Anthon the defendant
was arrested outside his hotel room when he was wearing only swimming
92. In Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990), the Court held that officers may conduct a
protective sweep incident to an in-home arrest provided they have a "reasonable belief based
on specific and articulable facts that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a
danger to those on the arrest scene." Id. at 337. The protective sweep is not a full search. Id.
at 335.
93. See Steven G. Davison, Warrantless Investigative Seizures of Real and Tangible Personal
Property by Law Enforcement Officers, 25 Am. CRIM. L. REv. 577, 604-605 (1988).
94. 455 U.S. 1 (1982).
95. Id. at 3.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 3-4.
98. Id. at 4.
99. Id. at 7 (emphasis added). The Court also noted that an officer may monitor the
arrestee's movements in order to prevent the arrestee's escape. Id.
100. Id. at 8.
101. See, e.g., United States v. Morgan, 743 F.2d 1158, 1164 (6th Cir. 1984) (The two
significant elements of the holding in Chrisman were that the arrestee requested to return to
his room and that there was a lawful arrest prior to the officer entering the room.), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1061 (1985).
102. Chrisman itself represented a departure from prior Supreme Court decisions in its
apparent abandonment of the exigent circumstances requirement for warrantless entry. See
Ira D. Wincott, Comment, Constitutional Law-Fourth Amendment-Plain View Exception to the
Warrant Requirement-Exigent Circumstances-Washington V. Chrisman, 29 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv.
125, 147-48 (1984).
103. 648 F.2d 669 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1164 (1982).
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trunks. The arresting officers returned the defendant to his room, with-
out his consent or request, in order to procure clothing for him.' 0 4 While
the officers were in the defendant's hotel room, they discovered cocaine
and marijuana. The court held that the defendant did not consent to the
police presence, and that no exigent circumstances existed which could
justify the officers' entry without a warrant.' 0 5
B. Tenth Circuit Opinion: United States v. Butler'0 6
On April 30, 1991, two Deputy United States Marshals and two county
sheriff's officers arrived at Butler's trailer in rural Oklahoma in order to
serve Butler with an arrest warrant. 10 7 The ground surrounding the trailer
was covered with broken glass, hundreds of beer cans, and parts from sev-
eral dismantled cars.10 8 Butler's trailer-mate Willis Bruce met the officers,
and one marshal told Bruce that he had a warrant to arrest Butler. Butler,
who was not wearing shoes, then came out of the trailer and was
arrested.' 0 9
There was no way to avoid the debris surrounding the trailer in con-
veying Butler to the officers' cars. 1 0 A marshal asked Butler if he had any
shoes to protect his feet. Butler stated that he had shoes, but that they
were in the trailer."' Bruce asked his girlfriend to retrieve the shoes, but
the marshal stated " 'Well, let's go on in and get them.' "112 While retriev-
ing the shoes, the marshal observed a loaded shotgun in Butler's room
which, as a convicted felon, Butler could not legally possess.' 1 3 The mar-
shal seized the firearm.
114
At trial, Butler moved to suppress the shotgun. The trial court relied
heavily on Chrisman in denying Butler's motion, and Butler was ultimately
convicted. 1 5 Butler appealed the trial court's denial of his motion to sup-
press the shotgun. 116 The Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial court's ruling,
holding that Chrisman supported the characterization of the marshal's
presence as lawful, and the shotgun seizure as valid under the plain view
doctrine. 117
104. Id. at 674-75.
105. Id. at 675. In addition, the court held that the arrest outside of the room would not
permit the characterization of the search inside the room as a search incident to a lawful
arrest, because that search is allowed only for the purposes of discovering and removing
weapons or preventing the destruction of evidence. Its scope is limited to areas within the
arrestee's immediate control. Id. (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969)).
106. 980 F.2d 619 (10th Cir. 1992).






113. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (1988).
114. Butler, 980 F.2d at 621.
115. Id. at 620-21.
116. Id. at 620.
117. Id. at 621-22.
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1. Majority Opinion1 18
The court initially discussed Chrisman, acknowledging that the de-
fendant in Chrisman had invited the officer into his dorm room. In Butler,
the marshal instigated the intrusion and Butler protested the marshal's
entry.119 Ignoring that distinction, the court proceeded to argue that the
marshal's intrusion was based on a genuine concern for Butler's welfare
and was not pretextual; that is, the marshal's intrusion was not made in
"bad faith." 120 Further, the court argued that even without an invitation,
as in Chrisman, police may "conduct a limited entry into an area for the
purpose of protecting the health or safety of an arrestee." 1' 1 The court
relied primarily on two cases from the Second Circuit, United States v.
Titus1 22 and United States v. Di Stefano123 , for its holding that police can
legally accompany an arrestee into his home in order to obtain
clothing.
1 24
Finally, the court distinguished Anthon by arguing that in that case
there existed no "legitimate and significant" threat to Anthon's health
which required that the police enter his hotel room. 125 In the instant
case, however, the marshal had a good faith belief that a significant threat
to Butler's safety existed. The threat to Butler's safety was an exigent cir-
cumstance which allowed the marshal to enter Butler's trailer.' 26
2. Dissenting Opinion
In her dissent, Judge Seymour stressed that the invasion of the privacy
of a person's home is the primary evil against which the Fourth Amend-
ment is directed. 127 The dissent disagreed with the majority's characteri-
zation that Butler's lack of footwear constituted an exigent circumstance
because he was in danger of being injured.' 28 The dissent noted that the
majority ignored the fact that Butler and his companions had just walked
back and forth across the debris in order to bathe in the river. In addi-
tion, Butler neither evinced apprehension that he would injure his feet on
the walk to the officers' cars, nor requested that he be provided with
shoes.
12 9
118. The majority opinion was authored by Patrick F. Kelly, District Judge, sitting by
designation.
119. Butler, 980 F.2d at 621.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. 445 F.2d 577 (2d Cir.) (holding that officers lawfully in defendant's house for arrest
purposes could seize items in plain view), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 957 (1971).
123. 555 F.2d 1094 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding that an officer could lawfully accompany the
defendant into her room so that she could change her clothes after she was arrested).
124. Butler, 980 F.2d at 621.
125. Id. at 622. See also text accompanying notes 103-05.
126. Id.
127. Butler, 980 F.2d at 622 (Seymour, J., dissenting).




The dissent also argued that the instant case was significantly different
from Chrisman. °30 The dissent stated that Chrisman stood for the proposi-
tion that a police officer could accompany an arrested defendant into his
home at the defendant's request. Chrisman did not represent that an of-
ficer could take an arrestee into the arrestee's house without his consent;
the arrestee's request was the linchpin to the Chrisman holding.1 3 ' Since
Butler did not request permission to enter his house or consent to the
marshal's entry, the seizure effected in the instant case did not fall under
Chrisman. The marshal was not legally in Butler's house when he observed
the shotgun. 132 Therefore, the plain view doctrine would not validate the
shotgun seizure.
133
The dissent further argued that Anthon was indistinguishable from the
case at bar. 134 The holding in Anthon was derived from facts in which
there were no exigent circumstances, the defendant did not request to
return to his room, and the defendant did not offer consent for the of-
ficers to enter his room.135 Butler, like Anthon, was not in danger, did
not request to enter his house, and did not consent to the marshal's
entry.
136
Finally, the dissent argued that the holding in Titus was based on an
exigent circumstance, namely, the prevention of the defendant's es-
cape.13 7 The instant case was distinguishable from Titus in that there was
no exigent circumstance to legalize the warrantless entry into Butler's
home. 138 The majority's view that an exigency existed therefore eroded
the protection of the Fourth Amendment by trivializing the exigency
requirement.
C. Analysis
The majority in this case allowed an officer to intrude into the de-
fendant's trailer without any of the justifications which the Supreme Court
and the Tenth Circuit specifically require for such an action. The marshal
did not have a warrant authorizing his entry into the defendant's trailer.
The arrest took place outside the trailer; therefore, a protective sweep,
which likely would not justify the marshal's actions in any case, does not
apply. The only possible justifications, as the majority recognized, were
130. Id. at 622.
131. Id. at 623.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. See also text accompanying notes 125-26.
135. Id. (citing United States v. Anthon, 648 F.2d 669, 675 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1164 (1982)).
136. Butler, 980 F.2d at 623 (Seymour, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 624.
138. Id. In distinguishing Titus the dissent stated "[tihe warrantless entry of a home to
prevent the escape of a defendant the police have probable cause to arrest is not analogous
to an entry to obtain shoes for a barefoot arrestee who does not request them." Id. The
dissent also noted that the holding in Di Stefano offered no additional support for the major-
ity's position since that case was from the same circuit as Titus and merely followed Titus as
precedent. Id.
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either that exigent circumstances existed, authorizing the marshal's entry,
or that the Chrisman rationale allowed the marshal to take Butler into his
own trailer, even absent a request from Butler.
Under the former rationale, there were no exigent circumstances
which could have justified the marshal's entering the trailer. As tradition-
ally defined,13 9 none of the exigent circumstance categories applied to the
situation in Butler. The only category which possibly could have applied is
the emergency situation, which the Supreme Court has narrowly con-
strued. 140 In order to argue that the emergency situation legalized the
marshal's entry to obtain Butler's shoes, the majority would have to argue
that the emergency situation made the marshal's entry imperative.
14 1
In this case, the danger was that of the defendant cutting his feet.
Not only is this type of danger relatively minor when compared with what
the Supreme Court has defined as an emergency situation, 142 but in fact
there existed no danger at all to the marshal or to Butler. 143 Butler did
not request the entry into his trailer to obtain shoes, and he evinced no
concern that he would injure his feet. 144 The majority based its holding
partially on the marshal's good faith attempt to protect Butler's feet.
14 5
The majority, however, cited no authority for the proposition that a good
faith attempt to protect a minor safety interest allows an officer to enter an
arrestee's home. Considering the low safety interest the marshal believed
he was protecting and its unlikely classification under any exigent circum-
stance category, the marshal's presence in Butler's trailer cannot be justi-
fied under an exigent circumstance exception to the warrant requirement.
The majority's reliance on Chrisman also is misplaced. The Chrisman
holding does not represent that an officer may return an arrestee to his
room and accompany the arrestee into his room for any reason. Rather,
the arrestee must somehow indicate that he desires to return to his room.
In that situation, the officer may accompany the arrestee for security pur-
poses. Other United States Courts of Appeals have interpreted Chrisman
in such a manner.
146
Moreover, the Court in Chrisman specifically authorized the officer's
presence in the dorm room to monitor the arrestee and to protect the
officer himself.14 7 Nowhere did the Chrisman Court imply that the protec-
tion of an arrestee would authorize an officer to force the arrestee to enter
his own home and allow the officer to enter as well. In Butler, there was no
indication that Butler requested or desired to enter his home to obtain
139. See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
140. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
141. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948).
142. E.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967) (holding that officers were
acting under exigent circumstances when they entered a dwelling to search for an armed
robbery suspect and weapons and where a delay in action would have endangered lives of
officers and citizens).
143. Butler, 980 F.2d at 623 (Seymour, J., dissenting).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 621.
146. See supra notes 101-02.
147. Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 7 (1982).
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shoes. The majority's misinterpretation of Chrisman led to a holding
which is both unprecedented and unjustified based on Supreme Court
and Tenth Circuit cases.
Finally, the court in Butler failed to distinguish Anthon in any meaning-
ful way. The majority's attempt to separate Anthon hinged on its statement
that there was in Butler "a legitimate and significant threat" to Butler's
safety whereas in Anthon there was no such threat.148 However, as the dis-
sent correctly noted, there was no legitimate threat because the defendant
had just safely crossed the very area with which the marshal was con-
cerned. 149 In addition, walking across glass and beer cans is hardly a "sig-
nificant threat."15 0 The holding that the danger of minor cuts qualifies as
a significant threat allows the exigent circumstances exception to swallow
up the warrant requirement. The holding in Butler disregards Tenth Cir-
cuit precedent and the precedent of other courts.
CONCLUSION
During the survey period, the Tenth Circuit brought its precedent in
line with other circuits in the area of warrant severability in the Brown case,
but unfortunately did not provide any meaningful direction to the trial
courts in determining when the doctrine should be applied. The Tenth
Circuit departed significantly from established precedent in the area of
warrantless entry in the Butler case, but offered no support for its trivializa-
tion of the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement.
Hopefully, the Supreme Court will address the difficult issues these cases
raise in order to avoid the confusion which the Tenth Circuit's decisions
will create in this area.
Paul Faraci
148. Butler, 980 F.2d at 622.
149. The dissent stated that "[taking an arrestee in bare feet across a littered yard he has
just traversed safely presents no greater exigency than taking an arrestee to the police station
in his bathing suit." Id. at 624 (Seymour, J., dissenting) (referring to Anthon).
150. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
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